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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM GARTH SEEGMILLER
and MARJORIE SEEGMILLER, dba
l\1.\DEMOISELLE BEAUTY SALON,
or ~IADEMOISELLE SALON OF
BEAUl~\~,

Plaintiffs-Appellants, Case No. 9933

vs.
~\T.,

1-IUNT, dba MADEMOISELLE
COIFFURES,
Defendant -

Respondent.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is a case involving both the Utah Statute applicable to tmdemarks (Title 70, Utah Code Annotated)
and the common law of trademarks, tradenames, and unfair competition.
Plaintiffs are the owners of a registration in the
State of Utah of the trademark "MADEMOISELLE"
issued to plaintiff June 2, 1961, for use in connection with
"beauty salon and supplies." The registration is ·based
on first use of the mark at least as early as May 1, 1959
on beauty salon cosmetics'\ such as hair styling spray, and
in connection with beauty culturre services such as are performed in beauty salons.
Plaintiffs' common law rights are based on first
adoption and use in and throughout the State of Utah of
the word "~1ADEMOISELLE" as a trademark and as a
trade or business name.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the courrt, sitting without a
jury. The court refused to grant the injunction as prayed
for by plaintiffs and found the registration of the trademark "MADEMOISELLE" by plaintiffs to be invalid.
RELIEF SO:UGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek reversal of the judgment of the lower
court and judgment in th·eir favor declaring their registrati:on with the Secretary of State of the State of Utah valid
and enjoining and restraining the defendant from using
the name "MADEMOISELLE" in th~e State of Utah.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
WHliam Garth Seegmiller and Marjorie Seegmiller,
his wife, began operation of the Mademoiselle Salon of
Bea·uty in Provo, Utah, on or about May 1, 1959 (Tr. 6,
Plaintiffs' Exhibit "A," 1-3-63) and at that time commenced the sale of hari·r styling spray in pressurized
cans bearing labels imprinted with the trademark "MADEMOISELLE" (Tr. 13, Exhibits "A" 4-5-63, "B," and
"C"). On June 2, 1961, the ·mark was registered with
the Secretary of State of the State of Utah, and a Certificate of Trademark Registration was issued to plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs were ·licensed for the years 1959, 1960,
1961, and subsequently with the Department of Business
Regulations of the State of Utah (Tr. 12, Exhibit "F,"
Exhibit "J," 4-5-63, Tr. 195 ) , such licenses being in the
name of Mademoiselle Salon of Beauty (William Garth
and Marjorie H. Seegmiller) . Plaintiffs held a grand
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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opening of their beauty salon on or a·bout May 23, 1959
(Exhibit "J ," 4-5-63, Tr. 24). The salon has since been
clearly and brilliantly marked and identified by a large
neon sign (Exhibit "F", 1-3-63, Tr. 9, 12).
Prior to the time defendant began business in Ogden,
Utah, plaintiffs advertised extensively over KLOR-TV,
the range of broadcast of which includ·ed Weber, Morgan,
Cache, Salt Lake, Rich, and other counties (Exhibit "F",
4-5-63, Tr. 88, 158, 159) . Plaintiffs also advertised over
radio stations KOVO and KEYY of Provo, Utah (Tr.
26, Exhibit "L"). KOVO could be heard all over the
State of Utah at nights (Tr. 26). Plaintiffs advertised
MADEMOISELLE SALON OF BEAUTY in t~he Daily
Herald of Provo, Urah, a newspaper of general circulation
in the State of Utah, and in the Brigham Young University Daily Universe (Tr. 14, 15, 16, 25, Exhibits "D",
"E"~ and "M"). The B.Y.U. Universe was distributed to
about 12 to 13 thousand students from practica'lly every
state in the Union (Tr. 16, 17). Plaintiffs advertised in
the telephone directories covering Utah County and
Nephi, in Juab County, in 1960, 1961, and 1962 (plaintiffs' Exhibits "S" "T" "U" Yellow Pages 24 26 and
'
'
'
' '
25, respectively, Tr. 69). Prior to June 2, 1961, plaintiffs spent about $5,500.00 in advertising MADEMOISELLE (Tr. 71).
Plaintiffs were well known throughout the State
under the name and style of MADEMOISELLE, and had
an excellent reputation (Tr. 93, 105, 106, 107, 109, 128,
130, 131, 133~ 135, 136, 146, 147). They have had customers from Brigham City, Ogden, Logan, Centerville,
as well as from many other parts of the State of Utah,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and from without the State of Utah (Tr. 76-79, and
149-156). Sales of trademarked containers of hair spray
took place in Salt Lake County to an Ogden resident long
prior to defendant's use of the name (Tr. 34).
In 1958, and prior to May 1, 1959, at the time the
name MADEMOISELLE was selected, there was no
other beauty salon in the State of Utah using the name
MADEMOISELLE. Plaintiffs had checked with the
Utah Department of Business Regulations (Tr. 10, 11),
checked telephone directories throughout the State (Tr.
9) , and could find no other beauty salon doing business
under the name or style of MADEMOISELLE (Tr. 22).
On or about May 19,1961, defendant, AI Hunt,
began business in Ogden, Utah, under the name of
MADEMOISELLE COIFFURES (Tr. 7, 41). Defendant ordered a sign for his business on or about April
1, 1961 (Tr. 41).
The name MADEl\1:0ISELLE was and is distinctive
(Tr. 109, 120), and confusion has resulted between
plaintiffs' and defendant's businesses (Tr. 120). The
court correctly found that the plaintiffs' and defendant's
tradenames were similar and would be confusing, but incorrectly found that the two companies are operating in
d1ifferent trade areas and that they are not in competition
with each other ( R. 12 ) .
Detendant claimed that he had not heard of the
use by plaintiffs of the name MADEMOISELLE before
June 2, 1961 (Tr. 41); then admitted that he had known
of it shortly after the defendant open~ed his business (Tr.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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42), and then finally admitted that it had :been mentioned to him that there was a MADEMOISELLE SA-.
LON in Provo, Utah, about the time the defendant
opened his business in Ogden, U·tah, (Tr. 186). T~e Defendant had discussed the name of MADEMOISELLE
with a Mel Greenhalgh, a $ales~an for the Peerless
Beauty and Barber Supply, Salt Lake City, before the
shop opened and at the time Defendant first contacted
~fr. Greenhalgh to order his equipment (Tr. 51, 184,
185). Mr. Greenhalgh was salesman for Peerless Beauty
and Barber Supply (Tr. 97) ; Plaintiffs had been d·oi~g
business with Peerless Beauty and Barber Supply from
the beginning in May, 1959 (Tr. 22, 25, 26).
Plaintiffs brought suit against the defendant· for injunctive relief to enjoin the defendant from further use
of the trade or service mark MADEMOISELLE and for
damages ( R. 1, 2). The matter of damages was reserved
by the court until the determination of the ownership of
the name 11ADEMOISELLE. The court found that the
plaintiffs' and defendant's trade names MADEMOISELLE are similar, and would be confusing, except that
the t\vo cotnpanies are operating in different trade areas.
The court furtl1er found that the plaintiffs' registration
of their nan1e vvith the Secretary of State would have
given the plaintiffs a right to use their tr~~e r:tame on a
state,vide basis had it been timely registered; however, the
lower court held that, at the time of registration on June
2, 1961, the defendant had previously adopted such name
and had not abandoned it and that the adoption was
v:ithout knowledge of plaintiffs' trade name. The court
further foand that plaintiffs' registration of their tradeSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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name on June 2, 1961, after the defendant had also
adopted such name, was invalid.
It is from this decision that plaintiffs prosecute this
app,eal.
ARGUMENT

I
BY REASON OF PRIORITY OF ADOPTION AND
USE, PLAINTIFFS ARE THE COMMON LAW
OWNERS IN UTAH OF THE TRADEMARK AND
TRADENAME "MADEMOISELLE" AS APPLIED
TO HAIR STYLING SPRAY AND COSMETICS
AND TO BEAUTY SALONS.
a.

Acquisition of Basic Rights

In the absence of prior conflicting right, the adoption and use of the t~rad~emark MADEMOISELLE by
plaintiffs as early as the year 1959 through their sale of
hair styling spray in containers bearing labels imprinted
with the mark (Tr. 13, Exhibit "C") established a common law right to the mark in plaintiffs.
"Undoubtedly, the general rule is that, as between conflicting claimants to the right to use the
same mark, priority of appropriation determines the
question."
Unit~ed

Drug Co. v. Rectanus Co.
248 u.s. 90, 100 ( 1918)
b.

Territorial Considerations
It is well recognized that such a right has terri torial
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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limits. Thus, it was held in a somewha·t earlier U. S.
Supreme Court case, cited with approval in the United
Drug case:
". . . . . where two parties independently are employing the same mark upon goods of the same class,
but in separate markets wholly remote the one from
the other, the question of prior appropriation is
legally insignificant, unless at least it appear that the
second adopter has selected rhe mark with some design inimical to the interests of the first user, such as
to take the benefit of the reputation of his goods, to
forestall the extension of his trade, or the like."
Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf
240 u.s. 403,415 (1916)
Ho\vever, with respect ~to what constitutes "separate
markets wholly remote th·e one from th·e other," the
court said:
"Into whatever markets the use of a trade-mark has
extended, or its meaning has become known, there
will the n1anufacturer or trader whose trade is pirated hy an infringing use be entitled to protection
and redress." (pp. 415, 416).
The extent of use in an area to create the right and
warrant the protection need not be large in the instance
of a technical trademark.
"In case cf a technical trade-mark as here dealt with
(Sweet Sixteen for dresses), while there must, of
course, be some user in trade in the disputed field of
trade, the quantum thereof need not be large."
Sweet SiX'teen Co. v. Sweet "16" Shop
15 F. 2d 920, 925 (CCA8, 1926)
In the cited case, wherein the defendants in Salt
Lake City were enjoined from continuing use of the name
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

''Sweet '16' Shop" for a dress shop, even though the
originai Cali,£ornia appropriators of the trademark "Sweet
Sixteens" and the tradename "Sweet Sixteen Company"
ha~ no store in Utah and had made only a total of eight
maii order sales over a period' of about two years during
t~e c~rculation in Uta·h of out-of-state newspapers contaim~g its advertisements and the distribution by it of a
quantity of mail order catalogues, the court referred to
the Hanover Star Milling :and United Drug cases (supra)
as follows:
"Obviously, the trade-marks under discussion in the
Hanover and Rectanus Cases were likewise technical
trade-marks, but in neither of the latter cases had
there been any sales, advertisements of goods, or user
whatever by complainants therein in the territory
there in controversy." ( p. 9 25 )
c.

Nature and Use of Plaintiffs' Mark

In the present case, it is obvious that the mark
MADEMOISELLE is a technical trademark on the same
basis that the court in the Sweet Sixteen Case (supra)
regarded SWEET SIXTEEN as such. In fact, the lower
court expressly found this so by its holding that plaintiffs'
Utah State Registration would have been valid if made
prior -to defendant's adoption of a similar mark. Moreover, even though the lower court gave as one of the
reasons for its decision adverse to plaintiffs that "the two
companies are operating in different trade areas and are
not in competition with each other," this is apparently
based on consid·eration of the service aspect of the case
without due regard for the trademaTk or tradename aspect, as in the Sweet Sixteen case.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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It cannot be denied that the evidence clearly shows
pcnf'tration and use of plaintiffs' trademarks in Salt Lake
and Davis Counties (Tr. 34) and at least extension of
the reputation of both trademark and tradename into
those and other neighboring counties (Tr. 13-19, 26, 7680, 83-87, 91-93, 128-131, 134-136, 146, 149-156, 174,
and 175. Exhibits "B", "C", and "G") prior to defendant's adoption of the mark, thereby establishing extendr.d rights as contemplated by both the Hanover Star
Milling and the Sweet Sixteen cases.
d.

Knowledge of Plaintiffs' Name by Defendant

Though the Sweet Sixteen case is much cited as
precedent for an exception to what has been termed the
general rule of the Hanover Star Milling case, because the
court found the defendants to have known of the plaintiff's use of its name before actual use by such defendants
of their infringing name, and, therefore, to have selected
the name "wi~th some design inimical to the interests of the
first user," careful analysis of the facts shows that the
differences there and here are very small even though
the lower court apparently found against plaintiffs on
this issue.
Thus, the defendants, there, received telegraphic
notification from the plaintiff only four days before issuance of a certificate of registration to them by the State
of Utah, and, though they had not actually commenced
business, it is apparent that they had filed for registration
at least ten days previously under the then existing Utah
la\v requiring publication once a week for two successive
,,·ccks. There \Vas no other evidence of knowledge by the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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defendants of the plaintiff's activities, although the circuit court apparently drew several inferences (Sweet
Sixteen Co. v. Sweet 16 Shop, supra, p 924) which
might reasonably be d~rawn in the present case on the
basis of reluctant admissions by the defendant here (Tr.
41, 42, and 184-186) and the circumstances (Tr. 22, 25,
26, 97).
In the present case, defendant positively knew of
plaintiffs' prior use of the name "sometime about the time
that we opened up" (Tr. 186).
e.

No Question of Estoppel Here

It is significant to n~te that both the Hanover Star
MiUing (supra, p. 419) and the United Drug (supra, p.
103) decisions stress the factor of estoppel as a reason for
denying protection to a trademark owner who confines
his use of the mark to a limited geographical area over a
period of many years (Hanover 40 years; United Drug
35 years).
In the Hanover case, the court said :
". . . . . they must be held to have taken the risk
that some innocent party might, during their forty
years of inactivity (in the contested area) , hit upon
the same mark and expend money and effort in
bui'lding up a trade in flour under it ... And when
it appears, as it does, that the Hanover Company in
good faith and without notice of the Allen & Wheeler
mark has expended much money and effort in building up its trade in the south-eastern market, so that
'Tea Rose' there means Hanover Company's flour
and nothing else, the Allen & Wheeler Company is
estopped to assert trade-mark infringement as to that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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territory." ( p. 419).
In the present case, the defendant knew of plaintiffs'
use of the name "sometime about the time we opened
up'' (Tr. 186) ; he had direct notice in writing from
plaintiffs within two and a half months (Tr. 47, Defendant's Exhibit 6) ; and th'is suit was commenced within
three months ( R. 1 ) .
It should be particularly noted that, in the Sweet
Sixteen case, the defendants acted on the advice of legal
counsel (Sweet Six~teen Co. v. Sweet "16" Shop, supra,
p. 921).
f.

On the Evidence, There Should be no Question as to
Plaintiffs' Rights Throughout the State of Utah

It is submitted that the present case is not one like the
Hanover Star Milling, the United Drug, and the Sweet
Sixteen cases, where the adverse use could reasonably be
said to be "in separate markets wholly remote the one
from the other" (Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf,
supra, p. 415). Rather, it is one such as Justice Holmes
had in mind when he said, in his concurring opinion in
the Hanover Star MiHing case:
.
"I think state lines, speaking always of matters
outside the authority of Congress, are important in
another way. I do not believe that a trade-mark
established in Chicago could be used by a competitor
in some other part of Illinois on the ground that it
was not known there. I think that if it is good in one
part of the State it is good in all. But when it seeks
to pass state lines it may find itself limited by what
has been done under the sanction of a power coordi-
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na~te

with that of Illinois and paramount over the
territory concerned." (p. 426)

Although the above vi·ew was directly criticized in
the rna j ority opinion ('p. 416) and has not been generally
regarded with favor by scholars in the field of trademark
law, it r-eceived tacit suppovt by th·e majority in the
Un~ted Drug case (only two and a half years later) sufficient to satisfy Justice Holmes when the entire court said:
"It would b·e a perversion of the rule of priority to
give it such an application in our broadly extended
country that an innocent party who had in good
faith employed a trade-mark in one· State ... might
afiterwa~ds be p,revent·ed from using it ... at the instance of one who therefore had employed the same
mark but orrly in other and remote jurisdictions... "
United Drug Co. v. Rectanus Co. (supra, p.
100)
Without urging the proposition that State lines
should be a:bsolute criteria, as might be implied from
Justice Holm·es' concurring opinion in the Hanover Star
MiHing oase (supra), it is submi~ted that they do have a
place in the consi,deration of trademark rights under the
common law and properly define the territory within
whlch plaintiffs' trademark and tradename rights should
be given protection by this Court under the facts of this
case.
See:
Callmann "Unfair Competition and TradeMarks"
2nd Ed. Vol. 3 p. 1202
Socony-Vacuum Oil Company, Inc. v. Oil City
Refineries, Inc.
136 F. 2d 470 (CCA6, 1943)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
g.

Holdings by Other Courts

The foregoing decisions are basic mthe law of trademarks as respects the acquisition and enforcement of territorial rights. The legal principles involved have been
followed or discussed time and time again, but with discretion based on the facts of each case and with a tendency toward upholding the first appropriator's rights
to an ever increasing extent.
Terminal Barber Shops, Inc. v. Zoberg et al
28 F. 2d 807 (CCA2, 1928)
Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Sahati
166 F. 2d 348 (C,CA9, 1948)
Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Lakeland Grocery
Corp.
301 F. 2d 156 (4CA, 1962)
Western Auto Supply Co. v. Western Auto Supply Co.
13 F. Supp. 525 (Dist. Ct. N.H., 1936)
Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Marcus
36 F. Supp. 90 (Dist. Ot. E.D. Pa., 1941)
Adam Hat Stores, Inc. v. Scherper
45 Supp. 804 (Dist. Ct. E.D. Wise., 1942)
Quality Courts United, Inc. v. Quality Courts,
Inc.
140 F. Supp. 341 (Dist. Ct. M. Pa., 1956)
It is interesting to note that, in the Terminal Barber
Shop case, a chain of barber shops and beauty parlors
in New York doing no business in New Jersey but having
customers there was granted relief from use of the name
in New Jersey by a later user.
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II
COMPETITION IS NOT AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF TRADEMARK OR TRADENAME INFRINGEMENT AT COMMON LAW.
"Lack of competition between the parties no longer
is a defense to an action for unfair competition.
Defendants have raised this ~ssue in cases where there
is no direct ~com pe~i tion .... because they do business
in different territovies. Formerly the emphasis was
on competition, and lack of it was considered a sufficient .defense .... In recent years this case (Borden
Ice Cream Co. v. Borden's Condensed Milk Co. 201
F. 510, 514 CCA7, 1912) has been distinguished and
its doctrine rejected (citing a long line of cases)."
Nims, Unfair Competition and Trade-Marks,"
4th Ed. pp. 1194, 1195
See also:
3 Restatement, Torts, par. 730, comment (a)
White Tower System, Inc. v. White Castle
System of Eating Houses Corp.
90 F. 2,d 67 ( CCA6, 1937)
Adolph Kastor & Bros., Inc. v. Federal Trade
Commission
138 F. 2d 824, 826 (CCA2, 1943)
Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Sahati (supra)
The Brass Rail, Inc. v. Ye Brass Rail of Massachusetts, Inc.
43 F. Supp. 671 (Dist. Ct. D. Mass., 1938)
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III
PLAINTIFFS' UTAH STATE REGISTRATION
CONSTITUTES PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF
THEIR EXCLUSIVE OWNERSHIP OF THE
TRADEMARK "MADEMOISELLE" FOR BEAUTY
S.~LON SUPPLIES THROUGHOUT THE STATE
OF UTAH AND IS VALID.
The Utah State Trade-Mark Act (Title 70, Utah
Code Annotated) provides:
"Any certificate of registration issued by the
secretary of state und·er the provisions hereof or a
copy thereof duly certified by the secretary of state
. . . . shall be prima facie evidence of exclusive ownership of the trade-mark or se:rvi·ce mark by the
registrant." (70-3-5)
State registration statutes are in affirmance of -~he
common la\v (CaHmann "Unfair Competition and Tradel\1arks," 2d Ed., Vol. 4, p. 2088), and, as such, base the
right to register on priority of use. The doctrines of Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf (supra) and United
Drug Co. v. Rectanus (supra) with respect to territorial
rights are actually exceptions to the general rule that the
first user of a trademark is its owner, see Point I (a)
herein and White Tower System, Inc. v. White Castle
System (supra).
Thus, the plaintiffs were completely justified in making oath at the time of filing their application for registration, on June 2, 1961, that "no other person has the right
to use such trade-mark or service mark ... in the State of
Utah."
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It is submitted that defendant has failed to uphold
his hurd·en of proof that there is, in fact, some other person who has the right to use plaintiffs' 'trademark in the State of Utah adversely to plaintiffs.
RespectfuHy submi,tted,
LIONEL M. FARR
574 East 2nd South
Salt Lake City, Utah
PHILLIP V. CHRISTENSON, for
CHRISTENSON, NOVAK, PAULSON &TAYLOR
55 East Center Street
Provo, Utah
PHILIP A. MALLINCKRODT
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants
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